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Abstract
Average utilitarianism and several related axiologies, when paired with
the standard expectational theory of decision-making under risk and with
reasonable empirical credences, can find their practical prescriptions over-
whelmingly determined by the minuscule probability that the agent assigns
to solipsism—i.e., to the hypothesis that there is only one welfare subject
in the world, viz., herself. This either (i) constitutes a reductio of these
axiologies, (ii) suggests that they require bespoke decision theories, or (iii)
furnishes a novel argument for ethical egoism.
Average utilitarianism (AU) holds that the overall value of a world is equal
to the average lifetime welfare of all welfare subjects in that world.1 Among
population axiologies, AU has some notable and distinctive virtues: For instance,
it avoids Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion” (Parfit, 1984), and would be chosen by
selfish agents from behind a particularly natural version of the veil of ignorance.
It has plenty of vices to counterbalance these virtues (see Hurka (1982a), among
many others), and has therefore never been an especially popular doctrine. But
it has attracted its share of advocates over the years, including Hardin (1968),
Harsanyi (1977), and Pressman (2015).2
In the world we appear to inhabit, AU has the slightly dispiriting consequence
that we can only make a very small difference to the overall value of the world:
Since the number of welfare subject is very large, even acts that produce enormous
welfare improvements in absolute terms have only minuscule effects on average
welfare.
∗christian.tarsney@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
1This, at least, is an especially natural and widely-discussed version of average utilitarianism.
There are others, which we will come to shortly.
2Mill (1863) can also be read as an average utilitarian (see Gustafsson, forthcoming, fn. 2),
though the textual evidence for this reading is not entirely conclusive.
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To illustrate: There are currently about 7× 109 human beings alive on Earth.
There are also many billions of mammals, birds, and fish being raised by humans
for meat and other agricultural products. And there are perhaps some 1011 mam-
mals living in the wild, along with similar or greater numbers of birds, reptiles,
and amphibians, and a significantly larger number of fish—conservatively 1013, and
possibly far more.3 This is despite a significant decline in wild animal populations
in recent centuries and millennia as a result of human encroachment.4
To determine the total number of welfare subjects (by which we can divide
total welfare to find an overall average), we must consider past as well as present
individuals. (Future individuals count too, of course, but their numbers are much
harder to estimate, and may depend on our choices.) Estimates of the number of
human beings who have ever lived are on the order of 1011 (Kaneda and Haub,
2018). But this number is dwarfed by past populations of non-human animals.
In wild animal populations, most individuals die young (with smaller animals
being both more numerous and shorter-lived), so birth and death rates in the wild
animal population as a whole are unlikely to be less than 1 per individual per year
(roughly corresponding to an average lifespan of 1 year).
Being extremely conservative, then, we might suppose that all and only mam-
mals are welfare subjects and that 1011 mammals have been alive on Earth at
any given time since the K-Pg boundary event (∼ 66 million years ago), with a
population birth/death rate of 1 per individual per year. This implies a “timeless
population” of at least ∼ 6.6× 1018 welfare subjects. Being a bit less conservative
(though perhaps still objectionably conservative), we might suppose that all and
only vertebrates are welfare subjects and that 1013 vertebrates have been alive on
Earth at any time in the last 500 million years (since shortly after the Cambrian
explosion), with a population birth/death rate of 10 per individual per year. This
implies a timeless population of at least ∼ 5× 1022 welfare subjects.
Even by the more conservative estimate, we find that providing one unit of
welfare to one individual increases average welfare by at most 1
6.6×1018 ≈ 1.5×10−19
units. By the less conservative estimate, increasing someone’s welfare by one unit
will increase average welfare by at most 1
5×1022 = 2× 10−23 units.
There is, however, one hypothesis according to which the total number of
welfare subjects in the world is quite a bit smaller: solipsism. Solipsism is the
proposition that only I exist (or, in your case, the proposition that only you exist),
and that what appears to be an external world populated with other individuals
is in fact just a figment of my (resp. your) imagination. If solipsism is true, then
the total number of welfare subjects, the size of the universal population, is one.
Solipsism is surely improbable. But just how improbable is it? Like average
utilitarianism, it has several notable virtues: It is simple and ontologically parsi-
monious. It is a natural conclusion to draw from various arguments for external
world skepticism (of the kind found, e.g., in Descartes (1641) and Berkeley (1710)),
3See Tomasik (2019) and citations therein. These numbers come with very large error bars,
but are more likely to be underestimates than overestimates, and in any case, the exact numbers
will not matter much for the arguments that follow.
4For instance, Smil (2013, p. 228) estimates that wild mammalian biomass has declined by
50% in the period 1900–2000 alone.
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if one does not simultaneously accept some “rescue” hypothesis like theism. (And
it is at the very least contentious whether those arguments for external world skep-
ticism have ever been satisfactorily refuted.) Solipsism also provides a powerful
answer to the otherwise intractable question “Why am I me?”—namely, “There
isn’t anyone else I could have been!” And finally, it is a recurring and enduring
idea in the history of philosophical thought, having been entertained (in various
forms) by such thinkers as the Buddhist philosopher Ratnakirti (see Kajiyama
(1965)), Wittgenstein (1922), and Hare (2009).5
For our purposes, it will be necessary to go beyond these general observa-
tions and say something about what probability one might reasonably assign to
solipsism. A bit more specifically, the interestingness of the following arguments
depends on the claim that one’s credence in solipsism should be not absurdly
small—not less than, say, 10−9 (one in a billion). Of course, assigning probabil-
ities to philosophical hypotheses is at best a matter of rough guesswork—we do
not, for instance, have objective chances to go by. But we can do better than
simply pulling plausible-seeming numbers out of thin air. We can, for instance,
consider a more complete and fine-grained space of possibilities over which our
probabilities should sum to 1, and aim for reflective equilibrium among the cre-
dences we assign to the various possibilities in that space. Fully carrying out that
exercise here would be a tedious experience for the reader. But we can do a first
approximation, aiming simply to find a plausible lower bound.
It seems clear that my credence that my commonsense view of the world has
“got things basically right”, metaphysically speaking, should not be greater than
0.9. That is, given how little we have to go on, the lack of expert consensus in
basic metaphysics, and trying to correct for the general human tendency toward
overconfidence, I should have at least 0.1 credence that the world is in some way
fundamentally very different than I take it to be. A good chunk of that credence
should go to “some possibility that nobody has ever thought of”. But it also seems
overconfident, conditional on my ordinary view of the world being wrong, to have
credence greater than 0.9 in that possibility. This leaves at least 1% of my credence
to distribute over known revisionary metaphysical hypotheses. And then to get
some sense of a lower bound on my credence in solipsism, I should ask first, “Are
there any other known revisionary hypotheses that are many orders of magnitude
more probable than solipsism?” (to which, it seems to me, the answer is “no”)
and second, “Are there thousands or millions of known revisionary hypotheses
that are at least roughly as plausible as solipsism?” (to which the answer again
seems to be “no”). Taken together, these observations suggest that my credence
in solipsism should be at most a few orders of magnitude less than 0.01.
All in all, then, while it would strike me as somewhat unreasonable to assign
solipsism a probability greater than 10−2, it also seems unreasonable to assign it
5It is hard to find straightforward endorsements of the strongest form of metaphysical solip-
sism, but this provides little if any evidence against the view: First, true solipsists have little
reason to publicize their beliefs. Second, and more to the point, if solipsism is true and the whole
external world is a figment of my imagination, there is no obvious reason to expect that I would
imagine the particular sub-figments that I mistake for other people to go around proclaiming
that the whole world is a figment of their imagination.
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Solipsism is false. Solipsism is true. EV
1− 10−9 10−9
Altruistic option 10
6
1018
= 10−12 0 ∼ 10−12
Selfish option 1
1018
= 10−18 1 ∼ 10−9
Table 1: Solipsistic swamping for average utilitarianism
a probability less than 10−9. To assign any more extreme probability would not
display due modesty about our understanding of matters metaphysical.6
Now, consider an average utilitarian, Ava, who assigns solipsism a subjective
probability of 10−9, and must choose between taking one unit of welfare for her-
self, or providing a thousand other welfare subjects with a thousand welfare units
each. And let’s suppose she believes that, if solipsism is false and the external
world/other minds are real (hereafter, “realism”), then the total number of wel-
fare subjects in the world is 1018. (For simplicity, I am rounding down our already
conservative lower-bound estimate of 6.6 × 1018, and ignoring the credence Ava
ought to have in larger population sizes, which would only strengthen our con-
clusions.) And let’s assume (without loss of generality) that whether solipsism is
true or false, average welfare prior to Ava’s intervention is 0. This situation is
summarized in Table 1.
Now, suppose that Ava responds to risk in the standard way, by maximizing
expected value. Given the facts stipulated above, the expected value of the altru-
istic option is (1 − 10−9) × 10−12 + 0 × 10−9 ≈ 10−12 while the expected value of
the selfish option is (1−10−9)×10−18 +1×10−9 ≈ 10−9. That is, even though the
altruistic option almost certainly yields a million times more value than the selfish
option, the selfish option has a thousand times greater expected value, because if
solipsism is true and only Ava exists, then Ava can have astronomically greater
impact on average welfare than she could otherwise hope for. Despite the enor-
mous disparity in stakes, we find that Ava ought to choose the selfish option as
long as her credence in solipsism is greater than ∼ 10−12. Conversely, holding fixed
her credence in solipsism at 10−9, we find that she should give her own interests a
billion times more practical weight than anyone else’s—i.e., her interests carry a
billion times greater weight in expectation.
6In drafting this paper, I become curious what credence people actually do assign to solipsism,
when prompted. So, in an extremely unscientific and non-incentive-compatible survey on social
media (n = 32), I asked respondents to assign credences to solipsism defined as “the hypothesis
that only I exist (or, in your case, the hypothesis that only you exist), and that what appears to
be a physical world containing objects, other people, etc is in fact just a product of/contained
within my (or, in your case, your) mind”. Among those who gave sharp credences, responses
spanned the range [0, 0.5], with a median of 10−2 and a mean of ∼ 0.105. Arbitrarily excluding
the answers I take to be clearly irrational (those outside the interval (0, 0.1]) still gives a median
of 0.01, but reduces the mean to ∼ 0.048. On the other hand, including a few participants who
gave interval credences, at the lower bound of their intervals, gives a median of 10−6 and a mean
of ∼ 0.091. Of course, all of these numbers are quite a bit greater than 10−9.
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We assumed that Ava accepts a particular (very natural) version of average
utilitarianism, which has been our exclusive focus so far. But as Thomas Hurka
has emphasized, there are many non-equivalent views that can be described as
“average utilitarian”. In Hurka (1982a,b), he describes a total of eleven such
views, which he names A1–A11. (Ava’s view, which I have called AU and which
tells us to maximize average lifetime welfare in the timeless population, is Hurka’s
A1.) These theories are not all equally vulnerable to solipsistic swamping. For A2,
which tells us to maximize the sum of momentary welfare averages (i.e., averaging
welfare at each time and then summing across times), the crucial number that
determines how much solipsism magnifies one’s efficacy is the size of the present
population, rather than the timeless population. For A7, which tells us to maxi-
mize the average lifetime welfare of present and future people (ignoring the past),
the crucial number is of course the size of the present and future population. So
either of these views somewhat dampen the swamping phenomenon. On several
other views (Hurka’s A3, A4, A6, A8, A9, and A11), which involve averaging across
times, things depend on how long the agent believes she will exist if solipsism is
true, and how long the Universe as a whole will contain welfare subjects if solip-
sism is false. A5 and A10 evade the solipsistic swamping problem entirely—but,
as Hurka points out, these views are independently very implausible.
Solipsistic swamping also threatens other axiologies that try to capture the
intuitive attractions of AU in large-population contexts (e.g., to avoid the Re-
pugnant Conclusion). For instance, consider the view that Hurka (1983) calls
“Variable Value I” (VV1), according to which the value of a population X is given
by
V (X) = Xf(|X|)
where X is the average welfare level in X, |X| is the number of welfare subjects
in X, and f is a function that is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and has a
horizontal asymptote.7 “Variable value” axiologies are meant to resemble total
utilitarianism for small populations and average utilitarianism for large popula-
tions, reflecting the intuition that adding more (happy) individuals to a population
adds value when the population is small, but has diminishing marginal value as
population size increases.
How vulnerable is VV1 to solipsistic swamping? Very roughly, the crucial
factor is the ratio r between f(1) and the horizontal asymptote of f . If this ratio
is much larger than the minimum population size conditional on realism, then
VV1 may agree arbitrarily closely with total utilitarianism, and so be safe from
solipsistic swamping. If r is much smaller than that minimum population size,
then VV1 will reduce the extreme practical weight that AU given to solipsism by
approximately a factor of r. To illustrate the latter case, suppose that
f(|X|) = 1− 1
1 + 10−9|X|
7This view is also discussed by Ng (1989), under the name “Theory X”.
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Solipsism is false. Solipsism is true. EV
1− 10−9 10−9
Altruistic option 10
3
1022
× f(1022) ≈ 10−19 0 ∼ 10−19
Selfish option 1
1022
× f(1022) ≈ 10−22 1× f(1) ≈ 10−9 ∼ 10−18
Table 2: Solipsistic swamping for Variable Value I
Here r ≈ 109, meaning that the “axiological weight” given to larger populations
converges to roughly one billion times the weight of a singleton population.
Now the problem of solipsistic swamping persists, but is much less extreme.
Since f(10
18)
f(1)
≈ 109, the relative weight of the solipsistic hypothesis is reduced
by a factor of nearly 109, and so using the numbers from our original example
(in Table 1), we now find that the altruistic option has greater expected value
than the selfish option. But the problem is far from vanquished. Consider a
new agent, Valerie, who (i) accepts VV1 with the f specified above, (ii) assigns
solipsism a credence of 10−9, (iii) accepts our slightly-less-conservative estimate of
the minimum population size conditional on realism, which for simplicity we will
round down to 1022 (as compared to 1018 in the case of Ava), and (iv) must choose
between taking one welfare unit for herself or providing a thousand other welfare
subjects with one welfare unit each (for a thousand units in total, as compared
to a million in the case of Ava). For Valerie, like Ava, selfishness is the order of
the day—even though she is nearly certain that the altruistic option will produce
far more value (Table 2). A bit more generally, given a VV1 axiology with the
f specified above, 10−9 credence in solipsism, and a minimum population of 1022
conditional on realism, Valerie should give her own interests at least 10,000 times
as much weight as anyone else’s, because of her credence in solipsism.8
On the other hand, the rank-discounted utilitarian (RDU) axiology defended
by Asheim and Zuber (2014) faces a more extreme form of solipsistic swamping
than even AU. On this view, the value of a population X is given by
|X|∑
r=1
βrwx(xr)
where the members of X are indexed in order of increasing welfare by their rank
r, and β ∈ (0, 1) is a constant that determines the degree to which worse-off
individuals are prioritized over better-off individuals.
This view does not uniformly discount the interests of each individual in large-
population scenarios, as average utilitarianism does—the worst-off individual, for
8Hurka also describes a few he calls Variable Value II, that applies an increasing and concave
transformation g to average welfare, so that the overall value of a population X is given by
g(X)f(|X|). This view behaves like VV1 for our purposes, with the additional caveat that, if g
is sufficiently concave or the amount by which an agent can improve her own welfare sufficiently
great, g will further moderate the difference in stakes between solipsism and realism.
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Solipsism is false. Solipsism is true. EV
1− 10−9 10−9
Altruistic option < 106 × β109 0 < ∼ 10−4337
Selfish option < 1× β109 β ∼ 10−9
Table 3: Solipsistic swamping for RDU (β = .99999)
instance, always gets exactly the same weight regardless of population size. But
because the weight given to the interests of better-off individuals diminishes expo-
nentially with their welfare rank, the interests of all but the very worst off can be
dramatically discounted in large-population scenarios. For instance, suppose that
Ragnar (i) accepts RDU with β = .99999 (β closer to 1 implies less discounting
of the better off), (ii) assigns solipsism a credence of 10−9, (iii) believes that there
are at least 1018 welfare subjects, conditional on realism, and (iv) must choose
between taking one welfare unit for himself or proving a million other welfare sub-
jects with one welfare unit each. Further, suppose Ragnar knows that none of the
million individuals he has the chance to benefit are among the 109 worst-off. (If
the total number of welfare subjects is at least 1018, then it is extremely unlikely,
in any given choice situation, that one is in a position to help any of the 109
worst-off.) On the other hand, Ragnar recognizes that if solipsism is true, then he
is very well positioned to improve the welfare of the very worst off individual in
the whole Universe—namely, himself.
Because the weight given to an individual’s welfare shrinks exponentially with
their rank, Ragnar will find that there is a truly dramatic disparity between the
solipsistic and non-solipsistic stakes (Table 3): If solipsism is true, then he can do
roughly 104343 times more good (by acting selfishly) than he could do if solipsism
is false (by acting altruistically). RDU, then, produces a much stronger form of
solipsistic swamping than even AU.9
So, not just AU but several other prima facie plausible population axiologies
as well are vulnerable (in different degrees) to solipsistic swamping. What are we
to make of this? We might say that solipsistic swamping is just another instance
of expected value calculations being dominated by tiny probabilities of extreme
scenarios (as, for instance, in Pascal’s wager (Pascal, 1669), Pascal’s mugging
(Bostrom, 2009), or the St. Petersburg game (Bernoulli, 1738)). This is true as
far as it goes, but serves only to categorize the problem, not to solve it. Perhaps
9Of course, the proponent of RDU could always hand-select a β close enough to 1 to avoid
solipsistic swamping. But apart from the ad hoc-ery of such a move, it seems very likely that
such a large β would make RDU practically indistinguishable from total utilitarianism. At the
very least, RDU must thread a very tight needle to avoid collapsing into egoism on the one hand
or totalism on the other. (And whatever β we choose, as long as we hold it fixed in the face of
new empirical information, we will be in constant danger of collapsing into solipsistic egoism if
we come to believe that the total world population is significantly larger than we thought, or
into de facto total utilitarianism if we come to believe that it is smaller.)
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the solution is to follow the perennial suggestion of simply ignoring very small
probabilities (Buffon, 1777; Smith, 2014; Monton, 2019), but this approach has
quite serious drawbacks and is generally considered unsatisfactory (Ha´jek, 2014;
Isaacs, 2016; Lundgren and Stefa´nsson, forthcoming).
Moreover, solipsistic swamping is just the limiting case of a more general phe-
nomenon, viz., that when combined with standard expectational decision rules,
average utilitarianism, variable value views, and rank-discounted utilitarianism
all seem to over-weight small-population scenarios. For instance, consider an av-
erage utilitarian who assigns 1% credence to the hypothesis that the Universe
will only ever contain 1020 welfare subjects, and 99% credence to the more opti-
mistic hypothesis that advanced future civilizations will eventually support 1050
welfare subjects or more (Bostrom, 2013). The same absolute welfare improve-
ment matters 1030 times more in the former scenario and therefore, discounting
for her credence, matters 1028 times more in expectation. Thus, even though she
is quite confident in the “optimistic” hypothesis, she should premise her choices
almost entirely on the “pessimistic” hypothesis.10 More generally, she will end
giving almost no practical weight to states that imply a very large population,
even when those states are very probable. Apart from optimism about the fu-
ture of humanity, such states might correspond to (i) hypotheses that attribute
sentience to more beings, e.g., to insects, other invertebrates, or relatively simple
artificial intelligences or (ii) cosmological hypotheses that imply that the Universe
is very large and hence contains many non-Earth-originating welfare subjects (as
well as exobiological hypotheses that imply a higher probability of welfare sub-
jects emerging in a given star system). If we find this general phenomenon of
“small-population swamping” counterintuitive, then ignoring small probabilities
won’t help, since we cannot assume that small-population scenarios will always
deserve de minimis probabilities.
Maybe the conclusion to draw is that some population axiologies cannot be
combined with standard decision theory, but must be equipped with their own,
bespoke theories of decision-making under risk that avoid the tyranny of small-
population scenarios. It not immediately obvious what these decision theories
should look like, and in departing from standard decision theory, they are likely to
incur significant theoretical costs.11 But in any case, if we conclude that certain
10Of course, this is complicated by the facts that (i) if the optimistic hypothesis is true, agents
like us may be able to have much greater impact on total welfare, and so perhaps a similar
level of impact on average welfare, and (ii) we may be in a position to significantly influence the
population size of future civilization.
11Here is one example: Teruji Thomas suggests an extension of average utilitarianism that
ranks risky prospects by expected total utility divided by expected population size (Thomas, 2016,
p. 150). This view straightforwardly avoids solipsistic swamping. But it has the very significant
downside of violating statewise dominance—that is, preferring options that yield worse outcomes
in every possible state of the world. (As proof: Consider a choice between a lottery L1 that
yields one individual with welfare 10 in state S1 or 9 individuals with welfare 20 in state S2, and
lottery L2 that yields 9 individuals with welfare 11 in S1 or 1 individual with welfare 21 in S2,
where S1 and S2 are equiprobable. L2 statewise dominates L1, by average utilitarian lights, but
the “expected total utility divided by expected population size” method of evaluating lotteries
gives L1 a value of 19 and L2 a value of 12.)
8
views in population ethics cannot safely appeal to the best developed and most
widely accepted theory of decision-making under risk, this on its own would be a
notable conclusion.
Absent some clever decision-theoretic escape, we are left with a conditional:
If average utilitarianism, a variable value view, or rank-discounted utilitarianism
is correct, then the best thing we can do, ex ante, to make the world a better
place is to act selfishly (to greater or lesser extents, depending on the axiology).
This leaves us, of course, with two further options: Reject all these axiologies, or
embrace (de facto, impartially motivated) ethical egoism.
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